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the panel's prior order, as amended, directing Google and YouTube to 
remove all or part of a film entitled Innocence of Muslims from its platforms 
worldwide and to prevent further uploads. As directed by the Court, this 
brief is limited to the issue of the stay order; it addresses the substantive 
issues raised by the Court's opinion only to the extent necessary to explain 
why the Court's previous denial of an emergency stay was appropriate. 
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
"Dear the end is near. " 
This is just one of the thousands of threats that Cindy Lee Garcia 
received after her benign performance in what convicted fraudster Nakoula 
Basseley Nakoula told her was an adventure film, Desert Warrior. Instead, 
unbeknownst to Ms. Garcia, Nakoula used part of her Desert Warrior 
performance and dubbed over another part to give the false impression that 
she had called the Prophet Mohammed a "child molester" and then inserted 
it, without her consent or knowledge, into a different film entitled Innocence 
of Muslims. The film was then posted on Y ouTube, and violent protests 
broke out around the world. The anger against Ms. Garcia was particularly 
intense, because although her appearance in the film was brief, Nakoula 
made it appear as though she had delivered one of the film's most 
inflammatory lines. She became the target of vile, gruesome, and-
according to law enforcement and court security personnel --credible 
threats, of which the following are only a small sample: 
"I am ready to die for MUHAMMAD (PB UH) and I would 
Like to Kill all Those Who Contributed in the Shape of Acting 
or Financially or any other Kind of Support in Shameless 
Movie." 
* * * 
4 
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"cindy lee I want to kill you. " 
* * * 
"if I find u anywhere I will fuck you deep bitch" 
* * * 
"the whole world is after you(ii)J!onna rap_e your adopted 
daughter, what calamity you Jiiive brought upon thyself?" 
* * * 
"ill kill who ever have hand in insulting my prophet" 
* * * 
"Hey u bitch why u make the movie innocence ofmuslimso 
Delete this movie otherwise I am the mafia don' 
* * * 
"it is my obligation that I tell you abut the true way o o o now 
your wtsh o o o search on true way 0 o o death is near to you" 
* * * 
"are u made u r dirty bitch I kill u stop the film otherwise kill 
u" 
In addition to these "freelance" death threats, Ms. Garcia was immediately 
made the subject of an Egyptian "fatwa," a religious order of execution. 
Worse yet, the media disclosed the location of Ms. Garcia's residence when 
journalists camped outside her home. Soon, not only Ms. Garcia, but also 
her family members and friends, received numerous threats of death and 
harm, which continue to the present day. Ms. Garcia was forced to flee her 
home. She cannot travel without substantial security. She has been escorted 
through courthouses by armed guards, and her very presence creates such a 
security risk that she has been banned from La Guardia International 
5 
Case: 12-57302     03/12/2014          ID: 9013384     DktEntry: 49     Page: 10 of 47
Airport. In short, Ms. Garcia's life has changed in ways that most people 
cannot imagine, all because a convicted fraudster lied to trick her into 
appearing in a film that then went "viral" on Google and YouTube's 
worldwide platforms. 
According to renowned Muslim scholar and counterterrorism expert 
Professor Abou El Fadl, a law professor and chair of the Islamic Studies 
Program at UCLA, Cindy Lee Garcia's life is forever changed, and the only 
reason that she is still alive is her public battle to have her performance 
taken down from Y ouTube. According to the head of security at the Los 
Angeles Superior Court, even Ms. Garcia's lawyers must exercise extreme 
caution, because the people who have issued the threats to Ms. Garcia, her 
family, and her associates, "are very patient." Plaintiffs lead counsel was 
warned that she and Ms. Garcia are in grave danger; counsel has been 
advised to inform courthouse security whenever she visits the Los Angeles 
Superior Court, even on unrelated matters. 
After Ms. Garcia learned what had been done to her performance, she 
begged Y ouTube and Google (collectively, "Google") to remove the film 
from YouTube, both because the content ofthe film violates Google's 
6 
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official policy against exhibiting hate speech 1 or copyright infringement2 on 
Y ouTube, and because she never granted Nakoula an express or implied 
license to use her performance in his propaganda film. Prior to filing this 
lawsuit, Ms. Garcia sent twelve separate DMCA notices asking for a 
takedown of copies of the film that contained her performance. Google 
refused to honor them. Even after Ms. Garcia explained the nature of her 
interest and the terrible danger that she was in, Google turned a deaf ear. 
Indeed, for all of Google' s professed concern about the "public interest" in 
this case, not a single individual representing Google has ever expressed a 
word of concern for Ms. Garcia's safety in the face of the many death threats 
Y ouTube users are prohibited from uploading "material that is 
copyrighted ... unlawful, obscene, defamatory, libelous, threatening, 
pornographic, harassing, hateful, racially or ethnically offensive or 
encourages conduct that would be considered a criminal offense ... " ER 
313. According to a lawyer for Google, "We encourage free speech and 
defend everyone's right to express unpopular points of view. But we don't 
permit hate speech, speech which attacks or demeans a group based on race 
or ethnic origin [or] religion ... " ER 317 (emphasis added). 
2 Google's own attorneys have testified, in another infringement case, 
that "Once Y ouTube receives a notification of alleged infringement that 
substantially complies with the DMCA's requirements, we act promptly to 
remove the identified material from our service or disable access to it." ER 
292. In other words, YouTube failed to follow its own procedure in 
connection with Garcia's takedown notices. Indeed, it appears that Y ouTube 
unapologetically refuses to follow its own procedures when it is 
inconvenient to do so. Perhaps this is because since its inception, 
YouTube's entire advertising-supported business model has been predicated 
on driving traffic to its site, even when the material contained therein 
infringes on the copyrights of others. 
7 
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that she continues to receive solely because Google insists on continuing to 
exhibit the video. Quite the opposite: Eric Schmidt, Google's chairman 
responded to requests to remove the video: "We believe the answer to bad 
speech is more speech ... it will stay up." ER 489, 496. 
In fact, Google has behaved in a way that is indifferent at best-and 
contemptuous at worst-notwithstanding the existence of the known and 
credible threats to Ms. Garcia's life. For example, Google has dehumanized, 
minimized, and derided Ms. Garcia's performance as, variously, "de 
minimis," a mere "5 second appearance," and "minuscule," despite the fact 
that she was made to appear to accuse the Prophet Mohammad of being a 
child molester. 3 
Fortunately, in spite of Google's attempts to demean Ms. Garcia as a 
"little person" unworthy of concern, the majority opinion found that Ms. 
3 Google has consistently downplayed the role that its refusal to take 
down the video has played in endangering Ms. Garcia's safety and indeed, 
her life. As this Court noted in its opinion reversing the district court: 
It is not irrelevant that the harm Garcia complains of is death or 
serious bodily harm; which the dissent fails to mention. Death 
is an 'irremedial ana unfathomable' harm and bodily injury is 
not far behind. To the extent the irreparable harm injut;y is at all 
a close question, we think it best to err on the side of life. 
(Opinion at 17 (citation omitted).) Google, on the other hand, has chosen to 
"err" by posting snide messages on YouTube trivializing Ms. Garcia's 
appearance in the film, completely ignoring the peril that its actions have 
caused Ms. Garcia while mocking the Court in the process. Declaration of 
M. Cris Armenta ("Armenta Decl."), ,-r 2, Ex. A (takedown message). 
8 
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Garcia is likely to succeed on the merits of her copyright claim. Just as 
significantly, the judges on the panel took Ms. Garcia's situation seriously, 
and balanced her intellectual property interests and her interest in her life 
and safety over Google' s business interests. It is important to note that the 
panel's opinion in this matter does not establish any new doctrine of 
copyright law. Rather, as the panel acknowledged, the reason that this 
situation presents a somewhat unique case is not because of the law, but 
because of the facts. The long-established practice of the film industry is to 
obtain either a work-for-hire agreement or a waiver and assignment of 
intellectual property rights-but Nakoula completely ignored that practice, 
despite this Court's prior guidance on the issue.4 Instead, he committed 
gross fraud for the purpose of obtaining Ms. Garcia's performance, thus 
invalidating any implied license that she might otherwise have granted. The 
Court's order, as amended, is narrowly tailored and recognizes that on these 
facts, there is a clear likelihood that Ms. Garcia will prevail under the well-
established law against copyright infringement. 
4 See Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Common 
sense tells us that agreements should routinely be put in writing. This simple practice 
prevents misunderstandings by spelling out the terms of a deal in black and white, forces 
parties to clarify their thinking and consider problems that could potentially arise, and 
encourages them to take their promises seriously because it's harder to backtrack on a 
written contract than on an oral one. Copyright law dovetails nicely with common sense 
by requiring that a transfer of copyright ownership be in writing."). 
9 
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In its previous two stay requests,5 Google trumpeted its purportedly 
altruistic motive in continuing to exhibit the film: the First Amendment. 
However, Google overlooks the fact that Ms. Garcia's copyright interests are 
also constitutionally protected, and that the courts have long acknowledged 
that there is no First Amendment right to violate copyright. Google is well 
aware that Ms. Garcia has not mounted a legal challenge to Google's right to 
express hatred for Islam. Ms. Garcia only complains that her copyright 
interests cannot be violated in a manner that results in speech that she detests 
being falsely attributed to her. 
Clearly, the panel balanced the risk to Ms. Garcia's life against 
Google's business interests, and chose Ms. Garcia's life. No harm will befall 
Google and YouTube if they comply with the order, other than perhaps a 
loss of ad revenue. The takedown order does not stifle public dialogue: 
because the takedown order only affects those versions of the film that 
infringe on Ms. Garcia's copyright-i.e., those versions that contain her 
performance-there is nothing in the order preventing re-posting of the film 
5 The Court's most recent briefing order gives Google a fifth bite at the 
apple in this case: first, in its opposition brief on the merits of the appeal; 
second, in its emergency stay request just prior to the issuance of the Court's 
opinion; third, in its subsequent emergency stay request just after the 
issuance of the Court's opinion; fourth, in its soon-to-be-filed petition to 
have this entire matter reheard en bane; and fifth, in its response to the 
Court's sua sponte request; of course, Google also opposed Ms. Garcia's 
motion for a preliminary injunction in the district court. 
10 
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in a version that omits Ms. Garcia. Accordingly, the second order protects 
Ms. Garcia's copyright interest while also allowing the free reproduction of 
the video, albeit without the "5 seconds" of footage that Google casts as 
"minuscule" when convenient. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TAKEDOWN ORDER SHOULD BE UPHELD PENDING THIS 
COURT'S DISPOSITION OF A PETITION FOR REHEARING EN 
BANC OR A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI 
A. Legal Standard 
This Court has been asked to vote on whether to revisit the order 
denying a stay of the takedown order. The legal standard to issue a stay 
pending Google's request for an en bane hearing of this case is committed to 
the Court's sound discretion. Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1203 ("A stay 
is not a matter of right ... it is instead an exercise of judicial discretion ... that 
is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.") (citations 
omitted).6 Google bears the burden of showing that it is entitled to have that 
discretion exercised in its favor. Id. ("The party requesting a stay bears the 
6 After conducting a diligent but ultimately fruitless search for binding 
authority on the appropriate standard of review at this procedural juncture in 
this Court, Ms. Garcia agrees with Google's observation, contained in its 
prior Emergency Motion for a Stay, that the law interpreting the standard for 
stays pending a petition for certiorari is analogous to the instant case. 
(Google's Second Motion for Stay at 5, n.l.) 
11 
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burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of this Court's 
discretion.") (citation omitted). Specifically, Google must demonstrate that 
it is likely to succeed on the merits, that it will be irreparably injured without 
a stay, that Ms. Garcia will not be "substantially" injured by a stay, and that 
the public interest lies in enabling global access to Innocence of Muslims.7 It 
is especially unlikely that Google will be able to make such a showing 
because, according to YouTube's own policies, practices and procedures, it 
routinely pulls content off its platforms that consist of copyright 
infringement or religious hate speech. Innocence of Muslims happens to be 
both. 
For the reasons set forth below, passim, Google cannot meet its 
burden to show that the circumstances of this case-which, as Google would 
like the Court to forget, involve threats of death and serious bodily injury to 
Ms. Garcia-justify the "intrusion into the ordinary processes of 
administration and judicial review" represented by a stay. Nken v. Holder, 
556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009). Not only is Google unlikely to succeed on the 
merits, the risk of irreparable and/or substantial injury is borne exclusively 
7 Requests for stays pending appeal are subject to the same analyses as 
requests for preliminary injunctions. Humane Soc Y. v. Gutierrez, 558 F.3d 
896, 896 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth the requirements for issuance of a stay 
pending appeal and citing Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 19 (2008), which addressed the issuance of a preliminary 
injunction). 
12 
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by Ms. Garcia, not Google. Finally, given that it is Ms. Garcia, not Google, 
who is threatened with "threats of physical harm and even death" (Opinion 
at 18), and that the First Amendment does not protect copyright 
infringement (cf Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-220 (2003)), public 
interest considerations weigh decidedly in Ms. Garcia's favor. 
B. Google Does Not Have a First Amendment Right to Violate Ms. 
Garcia's Copyright 
In its previous requests for a stay, Google suggested that because the 
public is (morbidly) interested in Innocence of Muslims, the company's right 
to continue to profit from its exhibition is a constitutional issue. Should 
Google continue to advance that argument, it would continue to be wrong. 
Neither Google nor the "public" have a First Amendment interest in this 
copyright dispute, and injunctive relief is entirely appropriate. 
It has been established since the earliest days of our country that 
freedom of expression does not include the right to infringe on the 
copyrighted works-to wrongfully profit from the creative labor--of other 
people. U.S. CONST., Art I, Sec. 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."). 
Lest Google attempt to create any misunderstanding on this issue, the 
Court should take heed of the Supreme Court's extremely blunt explanation 
13 
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of the intersection of the First Amendment and copyright law: to wit, there 
is no conflict between copyright law and the First Amendment because the 
Copyright Act specifically distinguishes between the expression of ideas 
(which are not copyrightable and which are protected by the First 
Amendment) and creative works fixed to a tangible medium (which are 
copyrightable and therefore may not be infringed by third parties, even if 
they really, really want to do so). See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). In that case, the Supreme 
Court also explicitly observed, "copyright laws are not restrictions on 
freedom of speech as copyright protects only forms of expression and not 
the ideas expressed." Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556, 105 S.Ct. at 2228, 
citing 1 Nimmer§ 1.10[B][2]. 
To the extent that Google may attempt to argue that Ms. Garcia's 
copyright deserves less protection because of the public interest in the film, 
Google is also wrong. The Supreme Court rejected this very argument, in a 
copyright case involving a fair use defense, as follows: 
It is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to 
accord lesser rights in those works that are of greatest 
importance to the public. Such a notion ignores the major 
premise of copyright and injures author and public alike. '[T]o 
propose that fair use be imposed whenever the 'social value [of 
dissemination] ... outweighs any detriment to the artist,' would 
be to propose depriving copyright owners of their right in the 
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property precisely when they encounter those users who could 
afford to pay for it. 
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559, 105 S.Ct. at 2230, citing Gordon, Fair Use 
as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax 
Case and its Predecessors, 82 CoLUM.L.REv. 1600, 1615 (1982). As one 
commentator has noted, "If every volume that was in the public interest 
could be pirated away by a competing publisher, ... the public [soon] would 
have nothing worth reading." Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A 
Gathering Storm?, 19 ASCAP COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUM 43, 78 (1971). 
C. This Court's Order Is Not a "Prior Restraint." 
Google has previously attacked the notion of a preliminary injunction 
in this case on the grounds that it would be an unconstitutional "prior 
restraint." ER 638-641. This argument, too, is unmeritorious. As an initial 
matter, Ms. Garcia notes that the availability of a preliminary injunction for 
copyright infringement is so well established in American law that it is 
memorialized in the Copyright Act itself. See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) ("Any 
court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under [the Copyright Act] 
may ... grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem 
reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright."). Although 
the inclusion of the preliminary injunctive remedy in the Copyright Act, in 
and of itself, does not definitively defeat a prior restraint argument, it is 
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worth noting that Section 502(a), as part of the 1976 Copyright Act, was 
passed against a background of well-established First Amendment law, 
including the law of fair use and prior restraint, of which Congress was well 
aware. Indeed, in a case that was decided several years prior to the 197 6 
Act, Justice Brennan noted that copyright cases are inapposite to the issue of 
prior restraint because copyright cases deal with restraint of the form of 
expression, not the ideas expressed. See New York Times Co. v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 713,716 n.*, 91 S.Ct. 2140,2147 n.**, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 
(1971) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. 
Penguin Books, USA, Inc., 924 F.Supp. 1559, 1575 (S.D. Cal. 1996) ("The 
Supreme Court has shown no receptivity to First Amendment arguments in 
the copyright context; to the contrary, it has noted that 'the Framers intended 
copyright itselfto be the engine of free expression' by supplying 'the 
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas."'), citing Harper & 
Row, 471 U.S. at 558, 105 S.Ct. at 2229. 
In addition to the statutory authorization of preliminary injunctions in 
cases such as this one, the case law has rejected the "prior restraint" 
argument on multiple occasions. The case of Religious Technology Center 
v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 923 F.Supp. 1231 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995), is instructive here. In that case, associates of the controversial 
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Church of Scientology filed a copyright infringement action against an 
individual who had posted materials, in which the Church held a copyright, 
on the Internet. The plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction, and the 
defendant argued, among other things, that a preliminary injunction would 
act as a prior restraint on his right to free speech. The court decisively 
rejected that argument and issued a preliminary injunction: 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Copyright Act itself 
embodies a balance between the rights of copyright holders, 
guaranteed by the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. I,§ 8, and the 
protections of the First Amendment. See Harper & Row, 471 
U.S. at 557-60, 105 S.Ct. at 2229-30; In re Capital Cities/ABC, 
Inc., 918 F.2d 140, 143-44 (11 1h Cir. 1990). The doctrine offair 
use already considers First Amendment concerns. New Era 
Publications International, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 
576, 584 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied 493 U.S. 094, 110 S.Ct. 
1168, 107 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1990) (rejecting defendant's argument 
that First Amendment concerns precluded granting an 
injunction, though finding other equitable considerations 
dictated denial of injunctive relief). Because [the defendant] is 
able to continue to criticize the Church and use its published 
and unpublished works to the extent allowed by the doctrine of 
fair use and because the injunctive relief sought is no broader 
than necessary to protect plaintiffs' copyrights, [the 
defendant's] First Amendment interests have been adequately 
considered. 
The same is true in this case. As noted above, Ms. Garcia has never 
advanced the argument that Google or anybody else should not be permitted 
to criticize Islam or to comment on this controversy. Nor has Google ever 
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advanced a "fair use" defense.8 Moreover, the Court's order makes it 
perfectly clear that Google may criticize Islam and/or comment on the film, 
and that it may host content on its platforms that contains such criticism and 
comment. The Court even narrowed its original order sua sponte to make it 
perfectly clear that the only thing that the order prevents Google from doing 
is violating Ms. Garcia's copyright. Because the order is narrowly drawn to 
cover only those postings of the film that constitute copyright infringement, 
it does not fall afoul of the prior restraint doctrine. See also A&M Records, 
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting First 
Amendment challenge to preliminary injunction against copyright infringer 
on the grounds that "First Amendment concerns in copyright are allayed by 
the presence of the fair use doctrine ... Users of copyrighted material that are 
not fair uses are rightfully enjoined.") (citations omitted); Dr. Seuss 
Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(preliminary injunction of parody that was "likely" to infringe copyright in 
children's books was not prior restraint; court characterized defendant's 
prior restraint argument as a "last resort"). 
Finally, this Court is requested to note that Eleventh Circuit has also 
considered and rejected the proposition that a preliminary injunction against 
8 Because Ms. Garcia anticipates that Google may make such an argument 
during this round of briefing, she preemptively addresses the issue. 
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copyright infringement represents an unlawful prior restraint.9 See, e.g., In 
re Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 918 F.2d 140, 143-144 (11th Cir. 1990). In 
Capitol Cities/ABC, Inc., the defendant argued that a preliminary injunction 
against the broadcast of a "made-for-TV" movie that infringed plaintiffs 
copyright would constitute a prior restraint. The Eleventh Circuit rejected 
this argument for two reasons. First, it noted that "the Copyright Act clearly 
contemplates injunctive relief to 'prevent' infringement," and cited a slew of 
cases from various jurisdictions in which the federal courts have issued 
preliminary injunctions to prevent infringement. 918 F.2d at 143, 143 n.9, 
citing Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (directing 
district court to preliminarily enjoin biography of author J.D. Salinger that 
contained unauthorized copies of Salinger's protected expression), 
supplemented by 818 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1987); Gilliam v. American 
Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (directing district 
court to preliminarily enjoin broadcast of Monty Python television program 
that, as in this case, distorted the copyright holder's performance); Universal 
City Studios v. Film Ventures International, 543 F.Supp. 1134 (C.D. Cal. 
1982) (issuing preliminary injunction against film Great White, which court 
9 Indeed, there appears to be no federal circuit court that has held that a 
preliminary injunction in a copyright case ipso facto constitutes a prior 
restraint. 
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found substantially similar to copyrighted film Jaws); Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Co-Op. Productions, 479 F.Supp. 351 
(N.D. Ga. 1979) (enjoining performance of musical production similar to 
Gone With the Wind); Douglas International Corp. v. Baker, 335 F.Supp. 
282 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (enjoining production of stage play concerning the life 
of Lenny Bruce); Marvin Worth Productions v. Superior Films Corp., 319 
F.Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (enjoining exhibition ofbiographical film 
about Lenny Bruce that infringed copyrighted materials). Second, the 
Eleventh Circuit noted that an order allowing the infringer to express the 
content of an infringed work (i.e., its ideas) in an alternative fashion that 
"does not infringe the copyrighted owner's protected manner of expression" 
would be suitably limited so as to not constitute an unlawful prior restraint. 
Of course, that is exactly what happened here: the Court, after thoughtful 
consideration both of the merits of the case and, apparently, the language of 
its initial order, narrowed the injunction against Google so that Google 
would only be enjoined against infringing Ms. Garcia's copyright. Google's 
right to broadcast any other material it likes related to, consisting of, or 
endorsing the ideas contained in Innocence of Muslims is unrestricted. 
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D. Because Ms. Garcia is Likely to Prevail on the Merits, The 
Takedown Order is Appropriate, In Light of All the 
Circumstances 
1. Ms. Garcia has a protectable copyright interest in her dramatic 
performance. 
Under the Copyright Act, dramatic works are copyrighted once they 
are affixed to a tangible medium of expression. 17 U.S.C. § 101, 102(a). 
Google claims that "an acting performance" is not among the list of 
copyrightable works. However, this Circuit has already acknowledged that a 
performer has a copyright interest in his or her contribution contained within 
a copyrightable medium. See Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada, 
Inc.L617 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2010) ("we think it is clear that federal 
copyright law preempts a claim alleging misappropriation of one's voice 
when the entirety of the allegedly misappropriated vocal performance is 
contained within a copyrighted medium"); Lesley v. Spike TV, 241 Fed. 
Appx. 357 (9th Cir. 2007) (acting performance copyrightable if it was created 
by author and if it "possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity"). 
Ms. Garcia's performance easily meets this requirement, and more. As the 
Court concluded in its opinion in this case, an actor must "live his part 
inwardly, and then ... give to his experience and external embodiment 
... that embodiment includes body language, facial expression and reactions 
to other actors and elements of a scene." Opinion at 8 (citation omitted). 
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Not only did Ms. Garcia "live" her part and deliver facial expressions, 
intonation and vehemence in the anger that she portrayed in the role of a 
mother protecting her daughter from an inappropriate marriage, but she even 
changed the lines of the script, thus rendering her performance an even 
greater expression of her own creativity. According to the Desert Warrior 
script, which Ms. Garcia attached to her Complaint, see ER 25, she was to 
deliver the following lines: "Are you crazy? Is your George crazy? Your 
daughter has not yet reached her 13th year yet. George must be fifty-five 
years old by now!" However, in the video--which is also part of the record 
at ER 491-Ms. Garcia delivers a different version of the line, one that she 
crafted, which states, "Our daughter is but a child, and he is fifty-five years 
old!"10 
The dissent view was that Ms. Garcia cannot be an "author" for 
purposes of the copyright law because as an actor, she read lines written by 
others and therefore, did not engage in an act of creation. Opinion at 25. 
Respectfully, however, Ms. Garcia believes that the dissent did not view nor 
address the manner of her performance nor the creative changes that she 
made to the script itself. See Opinion at 25. 
10 This portion of Ms. Garcia's performance was not overdubbed. See ER 
491. 
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Even the United States Patent and Trademark Office has taken the 
official position that "Under U.S. law, actors and musicians are considered 
to be 'authors' of their performances[,] providing them with copyright 
rights." United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), "Background 
and Summary of The 2012 WIPO Audiovisual Performances Treaty," June 
2012, available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/WIPO_A VP _TREATY_ 
FACT_SHEET.pdf. Ms. Garcia respectfully suggests that the dissent's 
reasoning is not persuasive and overlooks the key differences between the 
script (the creation of the purported filmmaker) and the performance that she 
actually delivered. According to the annotations to the Copyright Act, the 
list set forth in Section 1 02 as to what types of works are "copyrightable" 
(e.g., literary works, works of pantomime, and so on) are illustrative in 
nature. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 Ann. (Notes ofComm. On the Judiciary, House 
Report No. 94-1476) (also noting that "The copyrightable elements in a 
sound recording will usually, though not always, involve 'authorship' both 
on the part of the performers whose performances are captured and on the 
part of the recording producer for setting it up."). In other words, when it 
passed the Copyright Act, Congress specifically contemplated that both the 
performer11 and the producer would be "authors" under the Act: 
11 Who can dispute that actors infuse their creativity into their gestures 
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The second sentence of section 102 rthis section] lists seven 
broad categories that the concept of 'works of authorship" is 
said to "include." Id. "The use of the word "include," as defined 
in section 10 I [section 1 01 of this title], makes clear that the 
listing is "illustrative and not limitative," and that the seven 
categories do not necessarily exhaust the scope of"original 
worK.s of authorship" that ilie bill is intended to protect. Rather, 
the list sets out the general area of copyrightable subject matter, 
but with sufficient flexibility to free the courts from rigid or 
outmoded concepts of the scope of particular categories. The 
items are also overlapping in the sense that a worl< falling 
within one class may encompass works coming within some or 
all of the other categories. In the aggregate, the list covers all 
classes of works now specified in section 5 of title 17 [former 
section 5 of this title]; m addition, it specifically enumerates 
"pantomimes and choreographic worl<s. 
!d. Even if the dissent's view was correct and a dramatic performance that 
consists of reciting lines written by another is not protected under the 
Copyright Act, the record in this case shows that Ms. Garcia's performance 
was more than a rote line reading. As noted above, the record has been clear 
and line deliveries, such as Jack Nicholson with his signature eyebrow-
lifting smile, or former Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger with his announcement 
that "I'll be back" in Terminator, or Clark Gable with his dismissal of 
Vivian Leigh ("Frankly, my dear, I don't give a damn") at the end of Gone 
With the Wind? It is not the duration of an actor's performance that defines 
"authorship." The legislative history of the Copyright Act unequivocally 
demonstrates the performer is an author-the next questions become 
whether the performance was a "work for hire," whether the performer was 
an employee and whether a sufficient license existed to transfer the rights to 
the performance. In this factually extraordinary case, none of the questions 
can be answered in the affirmative. This is not a case of a bit actor or an 
extra objecting to editing or inclusion in a anticipated project, and it will not 
result in the "parade ofhorribles" that Google claims. The reason for this is 
because the vast majority of filmmakers have long used standardized 
contracts providing for the transfer of performers' rights. There is nothing 
untoward or offensive to the Copyright Act or the First Amendment about 
protecting the reasonable expectations of the performer in this extraordinary 
situation. 
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since the outset of this case: although Ms. Garcia was given a script with 
lines that she was to deliver, her actual performance (which, the Court is 
reminded, is not the same as the mutilated version that Google is currently 
exhibiting) demonstrates that Ms. Garcia in fact did exercise creative control 
by rewriting her lines. Accordingly, even if the dissenting opinion's more 
narrow view of the categories of copyrightable works is correct, in this case 
Ms. Garcia's creative contribution renders her work clearly protectable. 
2. The length of time that Ms. Garcia appeared in the film is 
irrelevant to the legal issue of her copyright interest. 
Since the issuance of the Court's order, Google has chosen to ridicule 
Ms. Garcia in its Y ouTube blocking notices as a mere actress with a "5-
second appearance." As noted in the introductory section of this brief, Ms. 
Garcia's appearance in the video is highly relevant because, first of all, her 
short appearance is the most inflammatory in the film and as Professor El 
Fadl declared, "goes to the very heart" of the incendiary film as a whole. ER 
251. Certainly, the individuals who threatened to gruesomely rape and 
murder Ms. Garcia and her daughter did not consider Ms. Garcia to be less 
culpable due to her relatively short amount of screen time. 
Nor does the law condone infringement where, as here, the infringing 
portion within a larger work is relatively small. "A taking [of another's 
intellectual property] may not be excused merely because it is insubstantial 
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with respect to the infringing work. As Judge Learned Hand cogently 
remarked, "no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his 
work he did not pirate." Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F .2d 
49, 56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 298 U.S. 669, 56 S. Ct. 835, 80 L.Ed. 1392 
(1936). 
Any suggestion that an injunction was improper, or that the panel 
overstepped by ordering an immediate takedown because this matter 
involves copyright, should similarly be rejected. The annals of American 
law are replete with cases in which the courts have affirmed that media 
outlets may properly be enjoined from infringing the copyright of others. 
See, e.g., New York Times Co, 403 U.S. at 731 n.1 (White, J. and Stewart, J., 
concurring) (asserting that "no one denies" that injunctive relief is 
appropriate to prevent newspapers from violating copyright); see also Arista 
Records, Inc. v. Flea World, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 411, 422 (D.N.J. 2005) 
(refusing to allow defendant to argue that a copyright owner's enforcement 
actions had a "chilling effect" on its First Amendment rights, because "the 
First Amendment is generally a protection of free speech against intrusion 
by the government, not as among and between private parties"). Injunctive 
relief in this or any other copyright case works no infringement at all on the 
right of speakers to convey their own ideas to others, provided that they do 
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not "borrow" somebody else's original performance to do so, as Nakoula 
and Google did here. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 221, 123 S.Ct. 
769 (2003) ("The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make-
or decline to make--one's own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers 
assert the right to make other people's speeches."); Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F .2d 1184, 1188 (5th 
Cir. 1979) ("The First Amendment is not a license to trammel on legally 
recognized rights in intellectual property."); Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. 
Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1295 (D. Utah 1999) 
("[T]he First Amendment does not give defendants the right to infringe on 
legally recognized rights under the copyright law."). 
3. The majority applied the appropriate standard for issuance of a 
prohibitory preliminary injunction (and thus, for denial of a 
stay). 
Ms. Garcia anticipates that Go ogle will anchor itself to the dissenting 
opinion in this case and argue that in deciding to issue the preliminary 
injunction (and subsequently, to deny a stay of its order), the Court should 
have applied the "particularly disfavored" standard that applies to 
"mandatory" preliminary injunctions. See Opinion at 19-21, citing, inter 
alia, Stanley v. University ofS. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 1984). If 
Go ogle adopts this approach, it will be wrong: under the settled law of this 
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circuit, the Court's narrowly tailored relief constituted a prohibitory 
injunction, not a mandatory one. See, e.g., Mehrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 
516 U.S. 479,484 (1996) (noting that a prohibitory injunction merely 
"restrained" a party from further illegal conduct, where mandatory 
injunction, in toxic clean-up context, required cleanup of prior toxic waste); 
see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 855 (9th ed.2009) (defining "prohibitory 
injunction" as an injunction that "forbids or restrains an act," and 
"mandatory injunction" as an injunction that "orders an affirmative act or 
mandates a specified course of conduct"), cited with approval in FTC v. 
Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, the nature of the Court's 
current order clearly reveals it is prohibitive in nature-it merely restrains 
Google from engaging in any further infringing conduct. See, e.g., Perfect 
10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp.2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (despite Google's 
attempt to characterize copyright infringement injunction as mandatory, 
court held that it was prohibitory, because it would require Google to cease 
its allegedly infringing activities, and any active steps Google might have to 
undertake to comply would merely be the means of discontinuing such 
activities.), rev'd on other grounds 653 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2011). As an 
initial matter, Ms. Garcia notes that the Stanley case, upon which the dissent 
relied, is not a copyright-infringement case. It was an Equal Pay Act case in 
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which the plaintiff had requested a preliminary injunction to force the 
University of Southern California to install her as head women's basketball 
coach, at a salary of $28,000 per year more than she had previously received 
in that position. 
The fact that this case involves preliminary relief for copyright 
infringement, not for employment discrimination, is an important distinction, 
and it is a distinction of which Go ogle is undoubtedly aware. In the case of 
Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F.Supp.2d at 837, the Central District of 
California held that an injunction that ordered Google to cease "allegedly 
infringing activities" would be "essentially prohibitory in nature ... 
Whatever active steps Google might have to undertake would merely be the 
means of discontinuing acts of infringement."12 Similarly, in this case, the 
Court only ordered Google to cease and desist from further conduct that 
consisted of infringing activity. Google wishes to view the order as 
mandatory because Google is essentially a massive automated machine-but 
copyright law is flexible enough to adapt to current technology. IfGoogle 
12 Although Perfect 10 was later reversed on the grounds that the 
plaintiff in that case had not shown a causal link between the infringement of 
its copyright and any irreparable harm that it might have suffered, the 
Central District's holding on the prohibitory nature of an injunction for 
preliminary relief from copyright infringement was not disturbed. 653 F .3d 
976 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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was infringing by showing the film in a new theatre every night to a live 
audience, it could not characterize the injunction as mandatory. The same 
result applies here. 
4. Google's unauthorized use ofMs. Garcia's dramatic 
performance is not a "fair use." 
Ms. Garcia anticipates that Google may attempt to argue that due to 
the public interest that has been excited by Innocence of Muslims, its 
continued exhibition of Ms. Garcia's performance is "fair use." 13 It is not. 14 
The purpose of the fair use doctrine, which the Supreme Court has 
characterized as an "equitable rule of reason," see Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 
at 560, 105 S.Ct. 2218 (citations omitted), is to prevent courts from rigidly 
applying the copyright laws in a way that would "stifle the creativity which 
that law is designed to foster." Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569, 577, 114 S.Ct. 1164, 127 L.Ed.2d 500 (1994) (quoting Stewart v. 
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236, 110 S.Ct. 1750, 109 L.Ed.2d 184 (1990)). The 
13 By claiming that Ms. Garcia's performance is minuscule or de 
minimis, Google appears to implicate a fair use defense. Cf Ringgold v. 
Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1997) ("de 
minimis might be considered relevant to the defense of fair use"). 
14 Ms. Garcia notes that fair use is an affirmative defense on which 
Google bears the burden of proof. See, e.g., Morris v. Young, 925 F.Supp.2d 
1078, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (characterizing fair use as an affirmative 
defense on which the defendant bears the burden of proof). Because Google 
has not yet filed an answer to the Complaint in this matter, it is not yet clear 
whether Google intends to assert a fair use defense. 
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fair use doctrine does not work to force speech by copyright holders, such as 
Ms. Garcia, who may prefer not to distribute their works. See Worldwide 
Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1115-
1116 (9th Cir. 2000) (copyright owner's withdrawal of copyrighted book 
from distribution did not give rise to free speech considerations supporting 
alleged infringer's claim of fair use, because case did not involve abuse of 
the copyright owner's monopoly as an instrument to suppress facts, and 
owner had right not to distribute book during term of copyright). 
In addition to the law of the Ninth Circuit disallowing abuse of the 
"fair use" doctrine to force unwilling copyright holders to "speak," the fair 
use doctrine does not apply here for another reason: the characterization of 
"fair use" as an equitable doctrine does not render it so elastic as to 
encompass Google's purely proprietary use of and interest in Ms. Garcia's 
performance. Under the Copyright Act, "fair use" protects only those 
infringing uses made for "purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research[.]" 17 U.S.C. § 107. There is nothing in the court 
record in this case that would indicate that Google or any primary infringer 
posted Ms. Garcia's performance for any of the purposes listed in section 
107. Google's only true interest in posting Ms. Garcia's performance is to 
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make money from advertising revenue. Google has never argued that its 
mere posting of the trailer, with no accompanying critique or analysis, is the 
type of creative act that the fair use doctrine typically protects. 
Even if Google could show that simply postings of the performance, 
copies that do not include any additional creative efforts, somehow 
constituted "news reporting," 15 it still could not show fair use, because the 
Y ouTube postings do not meet the statutory standard. That standard is as 
follows: 
In determining whether the use made of a work in any 
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall 
include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
( 4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value 
of the copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding 
of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the 
above factors. 
15 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 557, 105 S.Ct. 2218 (the promise of 
copyright would be an empty one if it could be avoided merely by dubbing 
the infringement a fair use "news report" of the work). 
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17 U.S.C. § 107. The recent case of Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 
F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012), in which this Court held that mere publication of 
photos that were "tantalizing and even newsworthy" for commercial 
purposes did not constitute fair use, provides a noteworthy explanation of 
the relevant statutory factors, along with certain "judicially-created 
consideration[ s]." 
With respect to the first factor, "purpose and character of the use," the 
Monge court held that news reporting "is not sufficient itself to sustain a per 
se finding of fair use." 688 F.3d at 1173.16 To the extent that Google simply 
relies on the "reporting" factor of the Copyright Act, then, that alone cannot 
16 The 1961 Report of the Register of Copyrights on General Revision of 
the US. Copyright Law cites examples of activities that courts have regarded 
as fair use: 
quotation of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of 
illustration of commentary; quotation of short passages in a 
scholarly or technical work for illustration or clarification of the 
author's observations; use in a parody of some of the content of 
the work parodied; summary of an address or article, with brief 
quotations, in a news report; reproduction by a library of a 
portion of a work to replace part of a damaged copy; 
reproduction by a teacher or student of a small part of a work to 
illustrate a lesson; reproduction of a work in legislative or 
judicial proceedings or reports' incidental and fortuitous 
reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast, of a work located in 
the scene of an event being reported. 
Innocence of Muslims is none of these things; and Google can hardly argue 
that it has not commercially exploited its own sites and the increased traffic 
to its platforms that has resulted from its hosting of Innocence of Muslims. 
33 
Case: 12-57302     03/12/2014          ID: 9013384     DktEntry: 49     Page: 38 of 47
justify a fair use finding. On the related issue of the "judicially-created 
consideration" of whether a report is "transformative," the court noted that 
"mere rebroadcast [is] not in itselftransformative." !d. at 1174, citing L.A. 
News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l., 149 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 1998); 
L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channe/9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 
1997). That, of course, is exactly what Google did in this case: it merely 
rebroadcast the film. There is nothing about the postings of Innocence of 
Muslims that constitute any "comment[] on [Ms. Garcia's] work." Monge, 
688 F.3d at 1175. Instead, it was a purely commercial venture, which the 
Supreme Court has held is "presumptively an unfair exploitation of the 
monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright" and that 
"tends to weigh against a finding of fair use." !d. at 1176, citing Sony, 464 
U.S. at 451, 104 S.Ct. 774; and Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562, 105 S.Ct. 
2218. Accordingly, the postings do not qualify for fair use protection as a 
news report. 
With respect to the second factor, the "nature of the copyrighted 
work," the court looks to whether the copyright work is creative and whether 
or not it has been published. Monge, 688 F.3d 1164. Here, because-as 
explained in the panel's opinion-Ms. Garcia imbued her performance with 
the substantial creativity required to "live" a character, her work was indeed 
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creative. Moreover, as set forth above, Ms. Garcia contributed additional 
creativity to her performance when she rewrote certain portions of her 
dialogue and delivered those lines rather than the ones that were in the script 
provided to her. In addition, it is undisputed that Ms. Garcia's work was 
"published"-it was affixed to the medium of film. Accordingly, the second 
factor weighs against fair use. 
The third factor is the "amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole." This factor, too, weighs in 
Ms. Garcia's favor. In a case from the Second Circuit that is notable for 
holding that a much less consequential infringement than that involved in 
this case was not de minimis, the court determined that the use of a 
copyrighted poster for a total of27 seconds in the background ofthe TV 
show Roc was not de minimis. The court held that poster was clearly visible 
and recognizable with sufficient observable detail for the "average lay 
observer" to view the artist's imagery and colorful style. Ringgold v. Black 
Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997) ("The legal 
maxim 'de minimis non curat lex' (sometimes rendered, 'the law does not 
concern itself with trifles') insulates from liability those who cause 
insignificant violations of the rights of others."). Because Ms. Garcia's 
performance, although it was brief, goes to "the very heart of' the incendiary 
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message in Innocence of Muslims, the use of her performance is hardly 
insignificant. Her performance is readily identifiable, given that media 
camped out in front of her house after the video went "viral." And, one 
needs only look to the effects that her performance has had-forcing her to 
go into hiding, to move, and to be subjected to gruesome threats and a fatwa 
for her execution-to see that the relationship between her appearance in the 
film and the film as a whole is substantial indeed. 
Finally, the Court should look to the effect of the use on the potential 
market for Ms. Garcia's work. In the Ninth Circuit, the likelihood of market 
harm may be "presumed" when the intended use is, as in this case, for 
commercial gain, although that presumption is not rigidly applied in every 
case. See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publishing, 512 F.3d 522, 531 (91h 
Cir. 2008) (so holding), cited in Monge, 688 F.3d at 1181 (determining 
market harm "in the first instance" on the grounds that the Supreme Court 
has admonished against presumptions related to the fourth fair use factor). 
Undoubtedly Google will argue that there is no market effect in this case, 
because Ms. Garcia is a new and obscure actress. However, market effect is 
not measured by the fame of the copyright holder. Rather, the Supreme 
Court has held that the market impact factor implicates the author's right to 
decide "whether and in what form to release his work." !d. at 1182, citing 
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Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 553, 105 S.Ct. 2218. As the Monge court noted, 
there is no telling what the future may bring. In that case, the court reasoned 
that the copyright holders might later change their minds about selling the 
photographs at the heart of that case, which were unauthorized photographs 
of their wedding. In this case, Ms. Garcia's notoriety may well create a 
market for her performance that might not have existed before. Either way, 
it is up to Ms. Garcia-not Google-to make the decision about whether or 
not to exploit her performance, at least during the term of her copyright. 
Accordingly, the "effect on the market" factor does not weigh in Google's 
favor. 
5. It was entirely proper for the Court to issue a preliminary 
injunction where, as here, Ms. Garcia showed a "likelihood" of 
success: a conclusive finding of liability is neither required nor 
appropriate. 
Google has suggested, in its two earlier motions for a stay of the 
Court's order, that a preliminary injunction is improper because the Court 
did not hold that Ms. Garcia is certain to win her case. Specifically, Google 
argued that this case is "doubtful"-and therefore that injunctive relief is 
inappropriate-because the Court's opinion contained the term "fairly 
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debatable." 17 
As an initial matter, Ms. Garcia notes that because this case came 
before the Court on the denial of a preliminary injunction, there is nothing 
inappropriate about acknowledging the possibility that Ms. Garcia may not 
ultimately prevail. Certainty of success is not the standard for issuance of a 
preliminary injunction: the standard is whether a copyright plaintiff makes a 
clear showing, see Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. v. WTV Systems, Inc., 
824 F.Supp.2d 1003, 1008 (C.D. Cal. 2011), of a likelihood of success. See, 
e.g., Idaho State University Faculty Ass 'n. v. Idaho State University, 857 
F.Supp.2d 1055, 1057 n.1 (D. ld. 2012) (in case involving challenge to email 
restrictions, holding that preliminary injunctions are issued on a showing of 
"likelihood" of success; there is no final resolution at the preliminary 
injunction stage); Kelly v. Gilbert, 437 F.Supp. 201, 204 (D. Mont. 1976) (in 
case involving challenge to compelled appearance before grand jury, holding 
that "it is not necessary to show the absolute certainty of success for 
issuance of the preliminary injunction."). Indeed, not only would it have 
been inappropriate for the panel to "raise the bar" with respect to the legal 
standard (which is what Google seems to request), but given that the 
17 Although Google repeats this phrase seven times in its brief(Google's 
Second Emergency Motion for Stay at 1, 4, 7, 10), in fact, the Court's 
opinion only uses it once. 
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appellate court does not play the role of a factfinder, it would have been 
inappropriate for the Court to have opined with certainty as to the ultimate 
disposition of this case by the district court. 
At any rate, the Court should be aware that Go ogle's characterization 
of the panel's opinion as being somehow equivocal on the likelihood of 
success issue, which is based entirely on the appearance of the two-word 
phrase "fairly debatable" once in the 18-page opinion, is misleading at best. 
According to Google, the appearance of those two words (in an opinion of 
more than 18 pages) shows that the facts and the law are not really in Ms. 
Garcia's favor and indeed, that those two little words render her entire case 
"doubtful." (Google's Second Motion for Emergency Stay at 7.) What 
Google does not fairly discuss, however, is the context of the supposedly 
dispositive phrase. Here is what the Court actually said: 
We need not and do not decide whether every actor has a 
copyright in his performance within a movie. It suffices for 
now to hold that, while the matter is fairly debatable, Garcia is 
likely to prevail. 
(Opinion at 10.) When one reads the entire sentence, along with the 
preceding sentence, it becomes clear that the Court was saying that "whether 
every actor has a copyright in his performance within a movie" is "fairly 
debatable," but that in this case-which is the only one being litigated 
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today-the likely outcome is clear. 18 Accordingly, Park Village Apartment 
Tenants Ass 'n. v. Mortimer Howard Trust, 636 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011), the 
case that Google has previously cited for the proposition that any uncertainty 
as to a case's ultimate outcome bars the issuance of a preliminary injunction, 
. . 1' bl 19 Is mapp tea e. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court 
DECLINE to rehear en bane the Court's order ofFebruary 28, 2014, 
denying a stay of the Court's prior orders, as amended, directing Google and 
18 Ms. Garcia notes that Google has misunderstood the standard of 
review that the Court was required to apply in reviewing the district court's 
ruling. In its second stay motion, Google argued that because the Court 
uttered the words "fairly debatable" (an argument that itself is founded on a 
reading comprehension failure), it was prohibited from overturning the 
district court, because the proper standard of review was "abuse of 
discretion". (Google's Second Motion for Stay at 7.) Google cites no 
authority for this proposition, but that is of no matter. Not only is Google 
wrong for having misread the Court's opinion, it is wrong about the standard 
of review that bound the panel, which with respect to questions of law, was 
actually a de novo standard. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F .3d 
091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (cited in Opinion at 5.) 
19 Park Village is a case that is factually very different than this one. In 
Park Village, unlike here, the plaintiffs "have not made any showing that 
they are likely to be harmed" by the defendants' conduct. 636 F.3d at 1160-
61. Google, along with the rest of the world, knows full well that that is not 
the case. In the words of the Court, "death is an irremediable and 
unfathomable harm, and bodily injury is not far behind." (Opinion at 17, 
citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986).) 
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Y ouTube to remove immediately all or part of the film entitled Innocence of 
Muslims from its platforms worldwide and to prevent further uploads. 
Dated: March 12, 2014 Respectfully submitted, 
Is/ M. Cris Armenta 
---
M. Cris Armenta 
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